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Abstract 
An experiment was performed on college students 
to study their memory for claims made about products 
mentioned in advertising slogans embedded in a story. 
The slogans either asserted a claim directly or merely 
implied that claim. The asserted version made a claim 
very directly and strongly (e.g., Eradicold cures the 
flu), while the implied version only suggested the 
stronger claim (e.g., Eradicold fights the flu). 
Subjects read the story, which contained one of the 
two versions of each ad. This story was a short 
scenario in which the protagonist finds him/herself in 
their vehicle driving through traffic while being 
exposed to advertisements on radio, park benches, 
billboards, etc. After subjects finished reading the 
story memory was tested using cloze (fill-in-the-
blanks) and multiple-choice tests. Results from both 
measures showed that subjects frequently falsely 
remembered an implied claim as having been asserted, 
while· the reversed seldom occurred. These findings 
have implications for the issue of consumers being 
misled by deceptive advertising. 
Introduction 
One problem in applied linguistics is how the 
language in advertising may mislead a consumer into 
believing some erroneous information about the 
performance of some product (Geis, 1982; Harris, 
Sturm, Klassen, & Bechtold, 1986). The issue of 
defining deceptive advertising has been hotly debated 
in the marketing literature (Armstrong, Gurol, & Russ, 
1980; Ford & Calfee, 1986; Gardner, 1975; Preston & 
Richards, 1986; Russo, Metcalf, & Stevens, 1981). A 
more cognitive approach may define the problem in a 
more information processing sense, i.e., in terms of 
whether a person comes to understand and remember 
information which is in fact inaccurate (Harris, 
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Dubitsky, & Bruno, 1983; Reece & Ducoffe, 1987; Russo, 
Metcalf, & Stevens, 1981). 
In the normal course of language comprehension, 
we frequently inf er beyond the information explicitly 
given in a text. People do not remember text 
literally but rather reconstruct it based on 
inferences drawn from it, the specific context of its 
use, and their own knowledge (e.g., Bransford, 
Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; 
Harris, 1981). 
One specific application of such research has been 
in the study of how people draw inferences from 
advertisements. The memory for an advertising claim 
can undergo alterations from an original claim which 
is only implied to a remembered meaning which states 
the claim more directly (Bruno & Harris, 1980; Harris, 
1977; Harris, 1981). Harris and his colleagues 
demonstrated that people go beyond what is stated in 
an advertisement to infer a stronger claim than what 
was presented (Harris, 1977; Harris, Dubitsky, & 
Bruno, 1983). In these studies, subjects were 
presented an advertisement which either directly 
asserted or strongly implied a certain claim about a 
product. In a sentence-judgment memory task, strongly 
implied claims were remembered as having been directly 
asserted. These studies have found this effect using 
both real-world and imaginary product names and with 
both a written text of the advertisement and an oral 
presentation. 
The present studies had the major purpose of 
extending these previous findings to recall and 
forced-choice-recognition measures in the somewhat 
more ecologically valid situation of reading connected 
discourse. An additional variable of a orally-induced 
situational context was also included, where subjects 
were told to imagine themselves as the protagonist in 
a story about either going shopping or visiting a 
friend. 
Experiment 1 examined both cloze cued recall of 
ad claims and a multiple-choice task. Experiments 2 
and 3 were brief followups looking at just one of 
these two measures individually, with the purpose of 
testing for possible inter-measure confounding. 
Experiment 
Method 
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Subjects. The subjects were 103 undergraduate 
students at Kansas State University. They received 
General Psychology course credit for participation and 
were recruited for a study in "memory for a story 
containing advertisements". 
Materials. Sixteen advertising slogans (S-20 
words long) for real products were written and 
inserted into a brief story written by the 
experimenters. There were two versions of each 
slogan. One type stated a claim directly (assertion), 
e.g., Eradicold cures the flu. The other only implied 
the same claim (implication), e.g., Eradicold fights 
the flu). The slogans were inserted into two versions 
of the story, each containing eight asserted and eight 
implied claims. The finished story contained sixteen 
slogans, counterbalanced across the two versions and 
the two types of claims. 
Procedure and Design. The subjects were given a 
page containing the story to read. This story was a 
short scenario in which the protagonist finds 
him/herself getting in a car and driving through 
traffic while being exposed to advertisements through 
radio, billboards, park benches, etc. Subjects were 
instructed to read the story and imagine that they 
were the protagonist in the story who was either (a) 
"going on a shopping trip" or (b) "visiting a friend." 
Upon receiving the story, subjects were to begin 
reading it at their own speed. The critical mention 
of going shopping or visiting a friend occurred three 
times ·in the instructions and comprised two levels of 
a between-subjects variable of context. 
After subjects finished reading the story they 
performed an intervening task of filling out index 
cards for course credit. Following the intervening 
task, the subjects were administered three types of 
memory tasks: filler, clozeJ and multiple choice, 
respectively, to determine if the different 
instructions about context or the different versions 
of· the ad affected their memory. 
As an initial filler task, the subjects were 
asked to recall all the product names (e.g, soap) and 
brand names (e.g., Safeguard) that they could remember 
from the slogans in the story. Following this filler 
task subjects were handed thirty cloze questions. The 
cloze questionnaire involved a duplication of the 
story but with several wcirds of the ads .deleted. The 
words deleted were key assertion and implication 
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phrases (e.g.,"GE light bulbs ."), as well as 
some control questions on non-ad material in the 
story. The subjects were asked to fill in the blanks 
"as accurately as possible." They were told to try to 
remember the exact words, but, if they could not, to 
write in the meaning as closely as they could 
remember. All subjects received the same cloze task, 
regardless of which story they had read. 
Finally, 28 multiple-choice questions (16 on the 
ads and 12 on non-ad material) were administered to 
the subjects. For the ad material, the four choices 
for each question included (1) correct assertion, (2) 
correct implication, (3) incorrect assertion, i.e., a 
different claim stated directly, and (4) incorrect 
implication, i.e., a different claim merely implied. 
The order of the four choices in each question were 
randomized. Whether (1) or (2) was the correct 
response for that question depend~d on whether the 
subject had read the asserted or implied version of 
that ad. Also included in the multiple-choice task 
were 12 questions on the non-ad content of the story. 
Results 
Only the results from the cloze and 
multiple-choice task were of interest here. 
Cloze data. Each response, regardless of which 
version was read, was scored as either an assertion, 
an implication, an omission, or an other. 
Paraphrasing was accepted if the basic idea was 
present and/or key phrases were used. For example, 
some of the responses given to an Alka-Seltzer cold 
medicine ad were scored as follows. The correct 
assertion was "provides instant relief for" common 
aches and pains. An acceptable paraphrase was 
"relieves." A paraphrase of an assertion judged to be 
different enough from the stimulus claim and thus 
scored as an other was "goes to work fast on". The 
correct implication was "helps lessen" common aches 
and pains. An acceptable paraphrase was "helps 
provide relief for." A distant paraphrase of an 
implication that ,was scored as an other was "could 
rescue." If no answer was given or the subject wrote 
something such as "cannot remember," the answer was 
scored as an omission. Such responses representing 
interference from real ads, such as "takes a licking 
and keeps on ticking" for the Timex ad, were scored as 
an other; the correct assertion was "will last 
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forever." The nonads were scored as either correct, 
incorrect, or as an omission. 
The group means for the cloze data appear in 
Table 1. Separate 2 x 2 analyses of variance were 
performed on each of the four types of responses. 
While there was no significant (p<.05) main effect in 
the number of asserted responses to the asserted and 
implied ads, there was a significant main effect in 
the number of implied responses to the two types of 
ads, F(l,101)= 13.85, MSe=l.73, p(.001. That is, if a 
subject read the asserted version of the ad, the 
implied response was seldom made. However, if the 
subject read the implied version of the ad, the 
implied and asserted responses were both more or less 
equally likely to occur. There was no significant 
(p(.05) main effect for the other responses or omitted 
responses. There was no significant (p<.05) main 
effect for the nonad items. No significant (p<.05) 
main effect or interaction involving context was found 
in any of the analyse~. 
Table 1 
Cloze Task: Number 
Experiment 1 
A I 
Read A 2.17 1.38 
Read I 1.86 2.06 
of Responses 
(Delay) Experiment 2 
other omit A I 
1.92 2.49 3.05 1.47 
1.80 2.30 2.47 2.50 
(Immediate) 
other omit 
1. 55 1. 92 
1.18 1.92 
Multiple-choice data. The multiple-choice data 
were scored by counting the number of (1) correct 
responses, (2) "alternative" responses, i.e., the 
paraphrase of the correct response, or (3) Other, 
i.e., either of the two responses of the other type, 
e.g., either of the two asserted-claim responses if 
the actual claim read had been implied. A 2 x 2 
analysis of variance was performed on the number of 
responses in each of these three response types, using 
the between-subjects factor of context (shopping or 
visiting a friend) and the within-subjects factor of 
type of ad read (asserted or implied claim). Mean 
number of responses in each category appear in Table 
2. 
The analysis of the number of correct responses 
showed a main effect of ad type, F(l,101)=7.35, 
MSe=l.23, p<.Ol, with more correct recognitions of the 
asserted than the implied ads (4.08 vs. 3.66). The 
analysis of the number of selections of the 
alternative response of the same type (i.e., the 
incorrect implied choice if the correct choice was 
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implied) showed the same main effect of ~d type, 
F(l,101)=13.34, MSe=.92, p(.001, with more such false 
alarms made after reading asserted than implied claims 
(1.25 vs •• 77). These two categories together may be 
considered as memory for the correct strength of the 
claim. Asserted claims were most of ten remembered as 
such, while implied claims were of ten falsely 
remembered as asserted. 
Table 2 
Multiple-choice Task: Number of 
Expt. 1 (Delay) 
Correct Altern. Other 
Read A ads 4.08 1.25 2.67 
Read I ads 3.66 .77 3.58 
Mean · 3.87 1.01 3.12 
R~sponses 
Expt. 3 (Immediate) 
Correct Altern. Other 
4.26 1.46 2.31 
3.69 .89 3.43 
3.97 1.17 2.87 
The analysis of the number of false recognitions 
of the other type of claim (e.g., choosing an asserted 
alternative if an implied statement had been present) 
also showed a main effect of ad type, F(l,101)=25.50, 
MSe=l.66, p(.001, but here the difference was in the 
opposite direction, with more such responses made 
after reading implied than asserted ads (3.57 vs. 
2.67). All of these results indicate that subjects 
reading an implied claim were frequently falsely 
recognizing a stronger (i.e., asserted) claim than 
what they had read, but that subjects reading an 
asserted claim were much less of ten falsely 
recognizing the weaker implied claim. In none of 
these analyses was any main effect or interaction 
involving context (shopping or visiting) significant. 
A simple one-way analysis of variance was 
performed on the number of correct recognitions of the 
nonad material with the single variable of context 
(shopping or visiting a friend). As expected, no 
effect was found. 
Discussion 
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Experiment 1 failed to produce an effect 
involving context. This could be because (1) The 
tasks are not sensitive to the context manipulation, 
or (2) Any potential effect of context was eliminated 
by the act of performing the preceding memory tasks 
and/or the fact that some time had passed. To explore 
this second possibility, two additional experiments 
were performed. Both used the same procedure and 
design as Experiment 1, except that, instead of three 
memory tasks, subjects performed only one, either the 
cloze task (Experiment 2) or the multiple-choice task 
(Experiment 3). If no effects of context are obtained 
in these experiments, then we know that the findings 
in Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to interference 
from the prior memory tasks or passage of time. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
The method and procedure of Experiment 2 were 
identical to Experiment 1, except that subjects 
performed only the cloze task, with no filler recall 
or multiple-Choice task.· There were 39 subjects. 
Results and Discussion 
The group means for the cloze data appear at the 
right of Table 1. Data were analyzed exactly as in 
Experiment 1, with separate 2 x 2 analyses of variance 
performed on each of the four types of responses. 
Results exactly paralleled those from Experiment 1. 
While there was no significant (p<.OS) main effect in 
the number of asserted responses to the asserted and 
implied ads, there was a significant main effect in 
the number of implied responses to the two types of 
ads, F(l,36)~10.18, MSe=2.04, p<.005. That is, if a 
subject read the asserted version of the ad, the 
implied response was seldom made. However, if the 
subject read the implied version of the ad, the 
implied and asserted responses were both likely to 
occur. There was no significant (p<.OS) main effect 
for the other responses or omitted responses. There 
was no significant (p<.05) main effect for the nonad 
items. No significant (p<.OS) main effect or 
interaction involving context was found in any of the 
analyses. Thus the results obtained in Experiment 
were replicated, indicating that the intervening 
filler recall test had no substantial effect on 
responses to the cloze task, except for lowering the 
overall accuracy level of recall. 
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Experiment 3 
Method 
The .method and procedure of Experiment 3 were 
identical to Experiment 1, except that subjects 
received only the multiple-choice task and no filler 
recall or ~laze task •. There were 35 subjects. 
Results and Discussion 
The multiple-choice data were scored and analyzed 
exactly as in Experiment 1, first by counting the 
number of (1) correct responses, (2) "alternative" 
responses, i.e., the paraphrase of the correct 
response, or (3) Other, i.e., either of the two 
responses of the other type, e.g., either of the two 
asserted-claim responses if the actual claim read had 
been implied. A 2 x 2 analysis of variance was 
performed on the number of responses in each of these 
three response types, using the between-subjects 
factor of context (shopping or visiting a friend) and 
the within-subjects factor of type of ad read 
(asserted claim or implied claim). Mean number of 
responses in each category appear at the right in 
Table 2. 
The three analyses produced exactly the same 
significant effects as those obtained in Experiment 1. 
The analysis of the number of correct responses showed 
a main effect of ad type, F(l,33)=4.24, MSe=l.39, 
p(.05, with more correct recognitions of the asserted 
than the implied ads (4.26 vs. 3.69). The analysis of 
the number of selections of the alternative response 
of the same type (i.e., the incorrect implied choice 
if the correct choice was implied) showed the same 
main effect of ad type, F(l,33)=6.0S, MSe=.92, p(.001, 
with more such false alarms made after reading 
asserted than implied claims {l.46 vs •• 89). 
The analysis of the number of false recognitions 
of the other type of claim (e.g., choosing an asserted 
alternative if an implied statement had been present) 
also showed a main effect of ad type, F(l,33)=14.26, 
MSe=l.53, p<.001, but the difference was in the 
opposite direction, with more such responses made 
after reading implied than asserted ads (3.43 vs. 
2.31). Thus, subjects reading an implied claim were 
frequently falsely recognizing a stronger (i.e., 
asserted) claim as what they had read, but subjects 
reading an asserted claim were much less often falsely 
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recognizing the weaker implied claim. In none of 
these analyses was any main effect or interaction 
involving context significant. 
A simple one-way analysis of variance was 
performed on the number of correct recognitions of the 
nonad material with the sin~le variable of context 
{shopping or visiting a friend). As expected, no 
effect was found. 
The fact that the results from the 
multiple-choice task in Experiment 3 were virtually 
identical to those obtained in Experiment 1 shows that 
neither the passage of time nor the interpolated 
activity of performing the filler and cloze tasks in 
Experiment 1 had any effect on memory. Neither can 
the lack of any context effects be attributed to the 
interference of these tasks or the passage of time. 
General Discussion 
These experiments have supported the previous 
findings of Harris, et al (1983) and extended them to 
the more realistic situation of reading connected 
discourse instead of single sentences. Also, the 
effect was observed with two different dependent 
measures, cloze and multiple choice. These findings 
thus argue that previously obtained effects are highly 
robust and generalizable. Very subtle linguistic 
changes thus can have a profound impact on memory. In 
making such memory "errors" subjects may be misled or 
deceived by ads which may imply a falsehood without 
stating it directly. 
The fact that no effect involving the 
instructional context manipulation was significant 
suggests that either such a manipulation simply has no 
effect on what was being measured or that the 
manipulation used in the present study was just too 
weak to produce the effect. Which of these 
explanations is more accurate must await further 
research. 
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